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R. v. Ryan and the Principle of
Moral Involuntariness
Kimberley Crosbie*

I. INTRODUCTION
In R. v. Ryan, the Supreme Court of Canada overturned an acquittal
premised on the defence of duress. Ms. Ryan, who by the time of the
appeal was using her family name, Doucet, had been subjected to a
“reign of terror” by her husband and feared that, after their separation, he
would carry through on his long-standing threats to kill both her and their
daughter. She attempted to hire someone to kill him before he could kill
her. This became known to the police and an undercover officer met with
Ms. Doucet under the pretence that he would kill her ex-husband. She
was subsequently charged with counselling the commission of an offence
not committed contrary to section 464(a) of the Criminal Code.1
Ms. Doucet raised the defence of duress at her trial and was
acquitted.2 The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown’s
appeal.3 However, the Supreme Court of Canada reversed this appellate
decision, holding that the defence of duress had no application to the
facts at bar.4 Despite this ruling, a majority of the Court refused to order
a new trial. They held that the ordeal Ms. Doucet had suffered and the
change in position by the Crown from trial to appeal resulted in one of
those clearest of cases in which a stay of proceedings was required.5

*

Crown Counsel at the Crown Law Office - Criminal. The views expressed in this paper
are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Ministry of the Attorney General for
Ontario. I am grateful to Matthew Shumka, articling student for the Scarborough Crown Attorney’s
Office, for his efforts in proofreading this paper.
1
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
2
R. v. Ryan, [2010] N.S.J. No. 154, 2010 NSSC 114 (N.S.S.C.) [hereinafter “Ryan
NSSC”].
3
R. v. Ryan, [2011] N.S.J. No. 157, 2011 NSCA 30 (N.S.C.A.) [hereinafter “Ryan
NSCA”].
4
R. v. Ryan, [2013] S.C.J. No. 3, 2013 SCC 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ryan SCC”].
5
Ryan SCC, id., at paras. 34-35.
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The Supreme Court’s decision on the defence of duress afforded
much-needed clarity to the law. In many respects, the decision was
consistent with past jurisprudence and was logically coherent. However,
Ryan left much to be desired with respect to those who may find
themselves in the same situation as Ms. Doucet. The Court could have,
with equal clarity and logic, upheld the decision of the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal. Ms. Doucet, on all the facts accepted by the trial judge,
was in a truly terrible situation with no way out. Her actions were found,
by both the Nova Scotia Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, to be
“morally involuntary” — the principle that underlies the defence of
duress and is embedded in section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms6 as a principle of fundamental justice. It dictates that
“morally involuntary” conduct should not be punished.7 That there was
no legal “excuse” for Ms. Doucet’s morally involuntary actions was, to
many, as will be discussed below, an affront to justice.
For the next Ms. Doucet, the defence of duress is off the table.
However, with the proclamation of the new self-defence provisions in the
Criminal Code,8 a new interpretation of a traditional defence may afford
further safeguards for vulnerable women in similar plights.9 In this paper,
I consider both the procedural history and the underlying facts of
Ryan, and offer a critical assessment of the Supreme Court’s decision.
In Part II, I provide an overview of facts as found by the trial judge. I am
6
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
7
See R. v. Perka, [1984] S.C.J. No. 40, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Perka”]; R. v. Hibbert, [1995] S.C.J. No. 63, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hibbert”];
R. v. Ruzic, [2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ruzic”].
8
Criminal Code, s. 34 (in force March 11, 2013).
9
The Ryan decision has been successfully applied to a situation in which a woman
committed an offence to escape her husband’s physical violence. Ms. Mazerolle was charged with
impaired driving. She testified that on the night in question, she and her husband both had been
drinking. It was about 1:30 or 2:00 a.m. Her husband was very angry and was yelling insults at
Ms. Mazerolle. He punched furniture and got more and more agitated. He became “enraged” and
picked her up, pushed her and threw her to the floor. He got on top of her and squeezed her arms and
shook her. She was about half of his weight. She somehow managed to get away and when running
out the door she grabbed her car keys. There had been several past incidents in which he had used
violence against her. During one incident, four months earlier, she called the police and her husband
had been charged. She knew she had to escape. She got into her car and drove down a country road
for about a minute. She pulled over and sat there for about 45 minutes thinking about where she
could go, all the while worrying that he would come and find her. She decided she would drive to
her parents’ house. It was on her way there that she was pulled over by the police. The trial judge
unreservedly accepted her evidence and her explanations for her actions. Applying Ryan, the trial
judge found that the Crown had failed to prove that the elements of the defence had not been
established. R. v. Mazerolle, [2013] N.B.J. No. 413, 2013 NBPC 21 (N.B. Prov. Ct.).
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careful to acknowledge the disputed status of “the facts” in this case,
specifically as contained in academic criticism subsequent to the
decision. In Part III, I present the state of the law with respect to duress
as it was at the time of the Ryan decision. I consider its application at
Ms. Ryan’s trial, and the ruling of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
affirming its use. In Part IV, I summarize the Supreme Court’s decision
overturning the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. I first consider the Court’s
ruling that the defence was not applicable to the facts of the case at bar.
I then turn to assess the state of the law following the Ryan decision,
which I ultimately characterize as having obtained much needed clarity
as a result of Ryan. In Part V, I turn to critique the Court’s decision.
I argue that the Court took too restrictive an approach with respect to
interpreting the law of duress, and failed to take account of both the
realities of domestic violence and prevailing Charter values. In Part VI,
my analysis takes on a more prospective nature. I consider the possibilities
of the new self-defence provisions found in section 34, and argue that
Ms. Doucet could have availed herself of them if they were in force at
the time. I conclude by offering a normative declaration with respect to
the potential of the newly enacted section 34, namely, that in order
to preserve and develop the potential in the new self-defence provisions
to help women like Ms. Doucet, counsel should ensure that section 34 is
interpreted through the lens of Charter values and with a contextualized
understanding of the realities of male violence against their intimate
partners.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE FACTS
An overview of the facts of Ryan cannot be presented without
acknowledging the fierce controversy surrounding “the facts”. Indeed,
the factual summary in the facta of the appellant and respondent on
appeal to the Supreme Court paint two very different pictures. The
former presented Ms. Doucet as a woman who had no good reason for
wanting Mr. Ryan killed and concocted the plan in order to get back at
him for the difficulties encountered during the civil proceedings relating
to their separation. The respondent spoke of years and years of abuse —
physical, sexual and emotional — and of a woman who was still in the
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grips of a reasonable and deeply held fear that her ex-partner would kill
her and their young daughter.10
Without doubt, aspects of the disputed facts had to be reconciled.
As the Court of Appeal noted, “at first blush, one might be highly
skeptical of Ms. Doucet’s assertion that she had no choice but to see her
husband killed”.11 The Court noted that she was no longer with Mr. Ryan,
she had a good job, a solid support network and custody of their
daughter. The “last explicit threat” he made against her was uttered a
couple of months before Ms. Doucet sought to hire the undercover
officer.12 Further, it is understandable that some would question her
assertion that she had no other avenues of escape. How can it be — with
a secure job, supportive family and support networks that are supposed to
be in place in Canada — that she had no other option?
However, the Supreme Court of Canada, three judges of the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal, and, importantly, the trial judge, accepted Ms.
Doucet’s account of the facts, that she had lived through a “reign of
terror” and legitimately feared for her life. It is the facts as found by the
presiding trial judge that are presented in this paper, and relied upon over
the course of the analysis.13 As elaborated below, the facts included years
of physical, sexual and emotional abuse; almost weekly threats of death,
at times accompanied by a detailed plan of how she and her daughter
would be killed and their bodies disposed of; and having a gun held
against her head on four occasions. Further, there was corroboration in
the form of testimony from the principal and vice-principal of the school
where Ms. Doucet taught; a teacher she worked with; her counsellor; a
man who experienced Mr. Ryan’s wrath during a road rage incident; and
medical records that showed Mr. Ryan had a persistent issue with “anger
management”. With this as the record, it is difficult to reconcile some of
the considerable suspicion and opposition to her plight. It is also

10
After the decision, Mr. Ryan put up a YouTube video criticizing the Court’s decision not
to re-try the case. He called the decision “a farce and a disgrace to our Canadian judicial system”.
See Christin Schmitz, “Court clarifies duress as a defence” The Lawyer’s Weekly. Mr. Ryan’s new
spouse posted a message in a blog about the case stating that the allegations levelled against
Mr. Ryan were all lies.
11
Ryan NSCA, supra, note 3, at para. 5.
12
Id.
13
But see Joseph Hanna, “R. v. Ryan: Some Answers, Some Questions and a Curious
Result” (April 2013) Ontario Bar Association – Criminal Justice Section [hereinafter “Hanna”]
(where the author reviews the original trial transcripts and highlights such evidence as Ms. Doucet
having only complained of verbal threats unaccompanied by physical violence on multiple
occasions).
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possible that the controversy over the facts is linked to a broader pattern
wherein women’s accounts of domestic violence are discounted and
undermined.14
Ms. Doucet and Mr. Ryan were married for about 15 years. Mr. Ryan
served in the military, which took them to Ontario, Alberta and Nova
Scotia.15 They had one child together, a daughter, born in 2000.16 Mr. Ryan
was considerably larger than Ms. Doucet, six foot, three inches and
230 pounds, compared to her five feet, three inches and 115 pounds.17
Over the course of their relationship, Mr. Ryan physically, sexually
and emotionally abused Ms. Doucet. In the first incident of violence, he
yelled and swore at her, forced her against a wall, punched the wall and
held his hand around her neck. He continued to pin her against the wall
about once a week thereafter, sometimes leaving her with bruises.18 He
also threw things at her, punched his fist against walls and frequently
forced her to have sex.19 The threat of violence against her was often
“imminent”.20 Many times, he threatened to kill or “destroy her”.21 Four
incidents of threatening death were accompanied by holding a gun to
Ms. Doucet’s head.22 At one point, he told Ms. Doucet that he would dig
a six-foot deep trench in the back of their property to bury her and their
daughter.23 He claimed that he would pile garbage on top so that no one
would notice anything. During another incident he threatened to “burn
the fucking house down” while she and their daughter were inside.24
Mr. Ryan further threatened her with retaliation if she ever tried to leave
him. His abusive behaviour intensified after their daughter was born.25 It
got to the point that she was often afraid to leave the house. She was lost;
she was isolated; she was without much hope.26
In the summer of 2007, after one of his “flings” that lasted longer
than usual, Ms. Doucet summoned the courage to ask for a divorce.
14

For such discussion, see generally Elizabeth Sheehy, Defending Battered Women on
Trial: Lessons from the Transcripts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014) [hereinafter “Sheehy”].
15
Ryan NSCA, supra, note 3, at para. 5.
16
Id., at para. 26.
17
Id., at para. 11.
18
Id., at para. 17; Ryan NSSC, supra, note 2.
19
Ryan NSCA, id., at paras. 15-16, 20.
20
Id., at para. 33.
21
Id., at para. 30.
22
Id., at paras. 27, 34-35. Mr. Ryan also abused and killed family pets (id., at para. 36).
23
Ryan NSCA, id., at para. 40.
24
Ryan NSSC, supra, note 2, at para. 45; Ryan SCC, supra, note 4, at para. 7.
25
Ryan NSCA, supra, note 3, at para. 27.
26
Id., at paras. 31-32.
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Mr. Ryan responded with violence and threats. Later that fall, after a
dispute with him over her mother’s money, she became so fearful that
she left their home to hide from him, living in different places.27 She
continued to gravely fear Mr. Ryan and was convinced he would follow
through on his threats to kill. She exhibited both physical and emotional
effects of the abuse and her fear, as described in the testimony of the
principals of the school in which she taught. It was around this time that
Ms. Doucet started to think of having her husband killed.28
Ms. Doucet said that she had called both the police and victim
services many times for help. The police told her to “go away”, and that
no assistance would be provided for “civil matters”.29 She also sought an
810 peace bond for protection but was told by the Crown and victims’
services that a peace bond would not protect her.30
In February 2008, Mr. Ryan showed up at her school, described as
her “place of refuge”. This caused her considerable concern for her
safety. Her anxiety escalated each time she saw him around. She felt that
she had no way out, stating:
There was no escape. Mr. Ryan knew me to a tee. He knew everything
about me. He knew how I behaved. He knew my routine. I knew when
he said something, he always acted upon it. I was trapped. I was
trapped and I had no way out, none. Nobody wanted to help. 31

As the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal put it, “Ms. Ryan was in a very
vulnerable state, she had lost a considerable amount of weight, was
dissociated and despondent. She had an intense fear of Mr. Ryan, was
feeling helpless, felt she had lost control and felt she was threatened with
annihilation.”32 It was around this time that the police got wind of her
attempt, and set up a sting operation. She was subsequently charged.33

27

Id., at paras. 42-44.
Id., at para. 45; Ryan SCC, supra, note 4, at para. 5.
Ryan NSCA, id., at paras. 46-48.
30
Id., at para. 50. But, see Hanna, supra, note 13 (in which the author asserts that the trial
evidence only revealed a description of one event where she reported her husband’s threats to the
police; this report led to her husband being charged although these charges were subsequently
withdrawn by the Crown).
31
Ryan NSCA, id., at para. 51.
32
Id., at para. 129; Ryan NSSC, supra, note 2, at para. 73.
33
Ryan NSCA, id., at para. 52.
28
29
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III. THE LAW OF DURESS IN THE COURTS BELOW
1. The General State of Duress until Ryan
Until Ryan, the law of duress was a “mess”.34 It is a defence both
under the Criminal Code and the common law. Given the Ryan decision
itself, and the focus of this paper, little will be said about how duress
worked (or did not work) in the past. A few points, however, need to be
considered in order to set the context for the Ryan decision and lay the
foundation for the ensuing discussion.
Section 17 of Criminal Code defines duress as follows:
A person who commits an offence under compulsion by threats of
immediate death or bodily harm from a person who is present when
the offence is committed is excused for committing the offence if the
person believes that the threats will be carried out and if the person is
not a party to a conspiracy or association whereby the person is
subject to compulsion, but this section does not apply where the
offence that is committed is high treason or treason, murder, piracy,
attempted murder, sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon,
threats to a third party or causing bodily harm, aggravated sexual
assault, forcible abduction, hostage taking, robbery, assault with a
weapon or causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, unlawfully
causing bodily harm, arson or an offence under sections 280 to 283
(abduction and detention of young persons).35

The Supreme Court long ago held that this provision is meant to
apply to principals of a crime who have allegedly committed a nonenumerated offence.36 By contrast, parties to an alleged offence must
resort to the common law defence of duress, which is preserved by virtue
of section 8(3) of the Criminal Code.37 Further, some courts have
found certain entries of the statutory list of excluded offences
unconstitutional.38

34
David M. Paciocco, “No-one Wants to Be Eaten: The Logic and Experience of the Law
of Necessity and Duress” (2010) 56 Crim. L.Q. 240.
35
Supra, note 1.
36
R. v. Paquette, [1976] S.C.J. No. 62, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 189 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Paquette”]. See also Hibbert, supra, note 7.
37
See Paquette, id.
38
In Ryan, the Supreme Court referenced the decision of R. v. Fraser, [2002] N.S.J.
No. 400, 3 C.R. (6th) 308 (N.S. Prov. Ct.), which declared the s. 17 exclusion of robbery
unconstitutional.
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In addition, the Supreme Court in Ruzic determined that aspects of
the statutory limitations built into section 17 to be unconstitutional —
specifically the wording requiring that the threats in question be directed
towards “immediate” bodily harm by a person who was “present” at the
time the offence was committed. The Court reasoned that these
limitations offended an accused’s section 7, Charter rights because an
accused who was threatened with future harm and who had “no way out”
would be denied a legitimate defence. The Court explained:
The underinclusiveness of s. 17 infringes s. 7 of the Charter, because
the immediacy and presence requirements exclude threats of future
harm to the accused or to third parties. It risks jeopardizing the liberty
and security interests protected by the Charter, in violation of the basic
principles of fundamental justice. It has the potential of convicting
persons who have not acted voluntarily. 39

However, to fill the gap left when the immediacy and presence
requirements were struck out, the Ruzic court supplemented section 17
with elements of the common law, namely, that there be:
•

no safe avenue of escape;

•

a close temporal connection between the act and the threat; and

•

a proportionate response.

This was the general state of the law when it was applied at Ms. Doucet’s
trial.
2. Duress at Ms. Doucet’s Trial and the Crown’s First Appeal
At Ms. Doucet’s trial, the Crown took the position that the defence of
duress had not been established on the facts. Justice Farrar of the Nova
Scotia Supreme Court disagreed and acquitted Ms. Doucet. He
determined that the defence was not only available to her, but that the
Crown had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each element
of the defence had not been made out. The trial judge accepted her
testimony about the years of abuse she said she suffered, without
39
R. v. Ruzic, supra, note 7, at para. 90. Ms. Ruzic was from Serbia. She was charged with
smuggling drugs into Canada. She pleaded that she had been ordered to bring the drugs in under threat of
bodily harm against her mother. She did not think that she could realistically turn to the police for
assistance. However, under the then stricter confines of s. 17, duress was unavailable because the person
who threatened her was not “present” and the threat was one that would occur in the future.
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qualification. He found that her fear of Mr. Ryan was justified.
Concerning her evidence about Mr. Ryan, the trial judge said the
following: “I have no difficulty in concluding that Mr. Ryan was a
manipulative, controlling and abusive husband, that sought at every turn
to control the actions of his wife …”.40
In appealing Ms. Doucet’s acquittal, the Crown argued that the
defence of duress could not apply to her situation. The Crown submitted,
in essence, that her claim of duress was nothing more than “an
inappropriate back-door plea of self-defence”. The Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal unanimously upheld Ms. Doucet’s duress-based acquittal. In
doing so, the Court thoughtfully and thoroughly considered the legal
history of duress.
In its determination that the law of duress could apply to the facts at
hand, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal focused on whether Ms. Doucet’s
conduct was “morally involuntary”. The Court was clearly concerned
about Ms. Doucet’s plight, a plight where none of the self-defence
provisions in force at the time applied.41 The Court recognized, however,
that her situation did not easily “fit” within the parameters of the defence
of duress. To apply duress to her circumstances would require the Court
to take the defence of duress “where it has never gone before”.42 After
acknowledging this, MacDonald C.J.N.S. asked:
Yet if Ms. Doucet truly had “no way out,” would it be just to deny her a
defence simply because her circumstances did not fit neatly into the
40

Ryan NSSC, supra, note 2, at para. 56.
Ryan NSCA, supra, note 3, at paras. 60-64. The appellate Court also questioned whether
self-defence should apply, given that it is a justification-based defence and not just an excuse-based
defence. The difference between the two was described this way in Perka, supra, note 7, at 246, 248-49:
Criminal theory recognizes a distinction between “justifications” and
“excuses”. A “justification” challenges the wrongfulness of an action which
technically constitutes a crime. The police officer who shoots the hostage-taker,
the innocent object of an assault who uses force to defend himself against his
assailant, the Good Samaritan who commandeers a car and breaks the speed
laws to rush an accident victim to the hospital, these are all actors whose actions
we consider rightful, not wrongful. For such actions people are often praised, as
motivated by some great or noble object. The concept of punishment often
seems incompatible with the social approval bestowed on the doer.
In contrast, an “excuse” concedes the wrongfulness of the action but
asserts that the circumstances under which it was done are such that it ought not
to be attributed to the actor. The perpetrator who is incapable, owing to a disease
of the mind, of appreciating the nature and consequences of his acts, the person
who labours under a mistake of fact, the drunkard, the sleepwalker: these are all
actors of whose “criminal” actions we disapprove intensely, but whom, in
appropriate circumstances, our law will not punish.
42
Ryan NSCA, id., at para. 73.
41
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traditional parameters of one of our enumerated defences. In other
words, must the defence of duress be limited to those situations where
the victim is a third party? If so, would there be a principled basis for
such a prerequisite? To answer these questions, I harken back to
Dickson, J. in Perka, where he invites us to concentrate on the rationale
of such defences, which is to excuse involuntary conduct.
Thus, my inquiry should focus less on who did what to whom in who’s
presence and more on the accused’s predicament and whether or not
her actions were truly involuntary. In other words, did Ms. Doucet have
an avenue of escape short of the “crime” she committed? On this basis,
should it matter that Ms. Doucet targeted her assailant as opposed to the
conventional third party? One would think not, but yet a closer look at
this defence is in order.43

Further, the Court noted that in order to properly interpret the
defence of duress, it must “fully understand the plight of battered spouses
(most often women) ... having reacted to threats from their abusive
partners”.44 It was with this understanding that the Court determined that
the defence had to be “sufficiently flexible to, when appropriate,
accommodate the dark reality of spousal abuse”.45
After undertaking a review of duress, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
concluded that the defence was available to a woman who tries to hire
someone to kill her abusive husband. In so doing, the Court commented:
I return to the rationale for this defence — to excuse morally
involuntary conduct. Viewed in this light, I can see no principled basis
to justify a distinction between the aggressor as opposed to a third party
being the targeted victim. After all, had Ms. Doucet attacked her
husband directly, self-defence would represent a potential avenue of
defence (based on Lavallee, supra). Therefore, it would be ironic
indeed to see her denied a defence for an indirect attack. 46

IV. THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
1. The Defence Does Not Apply to the Facts at Hand
The main issue for the Supreme Court was whether the defence of
duress was available to an accused person who tried to commit an
43
44
45
46

Id., at paras. 74-75.
Id., at para. 91.
Id.
Id., at para. 99.
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offence against the threatening party. This contrasts with the paradigmatic
example of duress whereby the accused commits an offence because he or
she is under the duress of the threatening party to do so. The Crown,
supported by the Ministry of the Attorney General for Ontario, took
the position that duress had no applicability to Ms. Doucet’s situation.
Ms. Doucet’s position was supported by the Criminal Lawyers’
Association (“CLA”), the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies
(“CAEFS”) and the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund
(“LEAF”).
As we know, the Supreme Court found that the defence of duress is
only available when a person commits an offence while under
compulsion of a threat made for the purpose of compelling her to commit
the very offence in question. In coming to its determination the Court
injected much-needed clarity and harmonization of the law in this area.47
The Court began its analysis of the issue with a look at its previous
decision in Hibbert, wherein Lamer C.J.C. noted the similarities and
dissimilarities between self-defence, as compared to duress and
necessity. Referring to the former, the Chief Justice said that:
... the victim of the otherwise criminal act at issue is himself or herself
the originator of the threat that causes the actor to commit what would
otherwise be an assault or culpable homicide. ... In this sense, he or she
is the author of his or her own deserts....48

Speaking of duress and necessity, the Chief Justice said that “the
victims of the otherwise criminal act ... are third parties, who are not
themselves responsible for the threats or circumstances of necessity that
motivated the accused’s actions”.49
A further distinction between self-defence and duress is that with
self-defence it is the victim who attacks the accused, the motive for
which is irrelevant. With duress, the threat is aimed at compelling
criminal action. Accordingly, “self-defence is an attempt to stop the
victim’s threats or assaults by meeting force with force; duress is
succumbing to the threats by committing an offence”.50

47
See Steve Coughlan, “The Rise and Fall of Duress: How Duress Changes Necessity
Before Being Excluded by Self-Defence” (2013) 39 Queen’s L.J. 83 [hereinafter “Coughlan, ‘The
Rise and Fall of Duress’”].
48
Hibbert, supra, note 7, at para. 50, cited in Ryan SCC, supra, note 4, at para. 18.
49
Hibbert, id., at para. 50, cited in Ryan SCC, id., at para. 18.
50
Ryan SCC, id., at para. 20.
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These two distinctions, namely, the role of the victim and the
compulsion to commit the offence in question, were part of what led the
Supreme Court to determine that it was an inappropriate stretch to apply
duress to the actions of Ms. Doucet. In addition, the Court noted two
other important points that informed its reasoning and conclusion. First,
Parliament codified the self-defence provisions and established what its
strictures would be. In contrast, duress is partly codified and partly
common law.51
The second important point underlying the Court’s decision was the
distinct rationales for the defences. With a successful claim of duress, an
accused is “excused” for his or her actions. The actions themselves,
while excusable, are nonetheless seen as wrong. The defence is excusedbased because it rests on the premise that only voluntary behaviour
should attract penal consequences.
The rationale underlying duress is that of moral involuntariness, which
was entrenched as a principle of fundamental justice in R. v. Ruzic,
2001 SCC 24, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, at para. 47: “It is a principle of
fundamental justice that only voluntary conduct — behaviour that is the
product of a free will and controlled body, unhindered by external
constraints — should attract the penalty and stigma of criminal
liability.” It is upon this foundation that we build the defences of duress
and necessity. As Lamer C.J. put it in Hibbert, the underlying concept
of both defences is “normative involuntariness”, in other words, that
there is “no legal way out”: para. 55. While the test to be met is not
dictated by this generally stated rationale underlying the defence, its
requirements are heavily influenced by it. As was discussed in Perka,
defences built on the principle of moral involuntariness are classified as
excuses. The law excuses those who, although morally blameworthy,
acted in a morally involuntary manner. The act remains wrong, but the
author of the offence will not be punished because it was committed in
circumstances in which there was realistically no choice: Ruzic, at para.
34; Perka, at p. 248. The principle of moral involuntariness is “[a]
concessio[n] to human frailty” in the face of “agonising choice”: Ruzic,
at para. 40; [other citation omitted]. The commission of the crime
is “remorselessly compelled by normal human instincts”: Perka,
at p. 249. As LeBel J. put it in Ruzic: “morally involuntary conduct is
not always inherently blameless” (para. 41).52

51
52

Id., at para. 22.
Id., at para. 23.
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With self-defence, the accused’s actions are justified. The actions
which are said to be criminal are not even seen as “wrong” — they are
seen as “right”. 53
This distinction carried with it two conclusions. First, defences based
on justification should be, and are, more “readily available” than excusebased ones. It would be incongruous, the Court determined, if a person’s
actions were not justified under the more readily available self-defence
but were covered by the more circumscribed excuse of duress. To hold
otherwise would result in incoherence in our criminal law.54
Second, following up on an earlier point the Court made, because
self-defence is entirely codified, courts cannot overstep their bounds and
“use the flexibility of the common law to develop duress” in such a way
that would intrude on the role of Parliament.
Duress cannot be extended so as to apply when the accused meets force
with force, or the threat of force with force in situations where selfdefence is unavailable. Duress is, and must remain, an applicable
defence only in situations where the accused has been compelled to
commit a specific offence under threats of death or bodily harm. This
clearly limits the availability of the offence to particular factual
circumstances. The common law elements of duress cannot be used to
“fill” a supposed vacuum created by clearly defined statutory
limitations on self-defence.55

After its determination that duress was not available to Ms. Doucet,
the Court then turned to the appropriate remedy. Eight of the nine
justices found that a combination of factors resulted in an exceptional
situation that warranted an exceptional remedy, a stay of proceedings.56
The four factors identified by the Court were as follows:57
(1) The law of duress was, at the time of her trial and appeal, unclear.
(2) The Crown changed its position about the law between the trial and
the appeal. As such, Ms. Doucet tried her case based on the Crown’s
original position and she might have conducted her case differently

53

Id., at paras. 23-25.
Id., at paras. 27, 31.
55
Id., at paras. 28-29, 32. It should be noted that the Supreme Court did not address
whether self-defence was potentially available to Ms. Doucet (id., at para. 31).
56
The usually defence-leaning Fish J. took exception to the stay and would have ordered a
new trial. Id., at para. 90.
57
Id., at paras. 34-35.
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had the Crown taken the position it did on appeal at her trial. Those
decisions may not be undone.
(3) Mr. Ryan’s abuse had taken an “enormous toll” on Ms. Doucet — as
had the five years of trial and appellate proceedings.
(4) “[T]he disquieting fact” that it appears the authorities were much
quicker to intervene to protect Mr. Ryan from harm than they were to
protect Ms. Doucet.
2. Adding Clarity to Confusion
As stated above, the Court took the opportunity this case offered to
provide much-needed clarity to the law of duress. The Court stated that
the defence of duress pursuant to section 17 and under the common law
form is, for the most part, identical, each sharing the following common
elements:58


First, there must be an explicit or implicit threat of present or future
death or bodily harm. The threat to cause harm can be directed either
at the accused or at a third party.



Second, the accused must reasonably believe that the threat will be
carried out if they do not act as directed.



Third, there is no safe avenue of escape. The defence does not apply
to persons who could have legally and safely removed themselves
from the situation. This element is to be evaluated on a modified
objective standard of the reasonable person similarly situated.59



Fourth, there must be a close temporal connection between the threat
and the harm that is being threatened. The connection must cause the
accused to lose their ability to act freely. The Court explained that
there is some interplay between this element and the third. As the
Ruzic Court had explained it, a threat that is “too far removed in time

58
However, certain differences between the two remain, namely: s. 17 applies to principals
and the common law defence to parties to an offence; and s. 17 lists a number of offences that are
excluded from its reach. The Court recognized that these differences create an inconsistent result.
Principals who commit one of the enumerated offences in s. 17 cannot rely on the defence of duress,
whereas parties to those very same offences can. However, the Court was not prepared to grapple
with that issue. Id., at paras. 83-84.
59
Id., at paras. 47, 81.
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... would cast doubt on the seriousness of the threat and, more
particularly, on claims of an absence of a safe avenue of escape”.60


Fifth, there must be proportionality between the harm threatened and
the harm inflicted by the accused. The harm caused by the accused
must not be greater than the harm avoided. In other words, there
must be a demonstrated “fortitude” or “resistance” to the threat. This
element is also evaluated on a modified objective standard.61



Sixth, to avail themselves of this defence, an accused cannot be “a
party to a conspiracy or association whereby the accused is subject to
compulsion and actually knew that threats and coercion to commit an
offence were a possible result of this criminal activity, conspiracy or
association”.62

The Ryan Court explained that the elements of belief that the threat
will be carried out, no safe escape and a close temporal connection must
be analyzed “as a whole”. As the Court wrote, “the accused cannot
reasonably believe that the threat would be carried out if there was a safe
avenue of escape and no close temporal connection between the threat
and the harm threatened”.63
Furthermore, the particular elements that the Court added into
section 17 when it struck out the immediacy and presence requirements
in Ruzic “tempered” the straight subjective belief standard that the
wording of section 17 required. In so doing, the interpretation of section 17
was brought into line with the principle of moral involuntariness. To
have one’s actions considered to be “morally involuntary” there must be
certain factors present, such as no safe avenue of escape and a close
temporal connection. The actions also must be in response to threats that
“‘a person of reasonable firmness’ with the characteristics and in the
situation of the defendant could not have been expected to resist”. 64
The actions of the accused must further be proportionate to the threat
in order to fall under the principle of moral involuntariness.
Proportionality is described as being “inherent” in this principle and is
evaluated, on a modified objective basis, with two things in mind: first,
the difference between the harm threatened and the harm the accused
60
61
62
63
64

Ryan SCC, id., at paras. 48-51, 81; Ruzic, supra, note 7, at para. 65.
Ryan SCC, id., at paras. 54, 81.
Id., at paras. 51, 81.
Id., at para. 51.
Id., at para. 52.
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caused; and second, a “general moral judgment” about the accused’s
behaviour. As Dickson J. explained in Perka:
There must be some way of assuring proportionality. No rational
criminal justice system, no matter how humane or liberal, could excuse the
infliction of a greater harm to allow the actor to avert a lesser evil. ...
... Determining this threshold is patently a matter of moral
judgment about what we expect people to be able to resist in
trying situations. A valuable aid in making that judgment is
comparing the competing interests at stake and assessing the
degree to which the actor inflicts harm beyond the benefit that
accrues from his action.65

V. ISSUES WITH THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
As noted above, the Court’s decision in Ryan provide much-needed
clarity on the law of duress. For some, however, the decision was
incredibly disappointing. It has been criticized for failing to reflect the
realities of domestic violence and for not according with Charter values.
As the interveners CAEFS and LEAF informed the Court, in Canada, a
woman is killed by her former or current male domestic partner every
six days. Most frequently, these homicides occur within two years of a
separation and sometimes children (and other family members) are also
killed.66 Many of the factors understood as risk factors for lethal violence
were present in Ms. Doucet’s situation. Accordingly, the interveners
argued, the Court was required to assess the case in recognition of the
realities of women’s lives. After the decision, LEAF and CAEFS released
a joint statement criticizing the decision for failing to “capture the
diversity of human experience”. Others asserted that the Court cared more
about conceptual stability than about the evolution of the common law.67
This criticism stands in stark contrast to the reception advocates and
some academics gave to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s decision.
Advocates for abused women applauded the decision. A Ms. Magazine
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Id., at paras. 54, 70-74, citing Perka, supra, note 7, at 252.
Factum of the interveners, at para. 1, citing Statistics Canada, Juristat, Homicide in
Canada, 2010 by T. Mahoney (Ottawa: StatCan, October 26, 2011), at 11-12; Statistics Canada,
Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile, 2011 (Ottawa: StatCan, 2011), at 37-38.
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LEAF/CAEFS News Release, “Supreme Court Misses Opportunity to Ensure Law
Protects Abused Women” (January 18, 2013).
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blog called it “a beacon of hope”.68 Professor Elizabeth Sheehy, an expert
on criminal law and male violence against women, identified it a “legal
breakthrough”.69
The Supreme Court could have followed the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal’s flexible and contextual interpretation of the defence. To do so
would have been to recognize the grim reality faced by Ms. Doucet. She
was “a person who commit[ed] an offence under compulsion by threats”.
The threats were “temporally connected” and were from a person who
she reasonably believed would carry out those threats. She believed she
had “no other safe avenue of escape”. Her actions were seen by both
courts below as proportional. Her actions satisfied the requirements of
“morally involuntary”. She was not a party to a conspiracy or association
and she was not charged with one of the excluded offences listed in the
section. All of the six elements of the defence could have been met, and
were recognized as having been met by both the Nova Scotia Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeal.
Arguably, adopting the interpretation of the provision in the courts
below would not have intruded any further into Parliament’s role than it
did in Ruzic. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal did not base its decision
on “filling in a gap” that the inapplicability of the old self-defence
provisions created. The appellate court simply noted that self-defence
could not have applied and then moved on to separately assess whether
the defence of duress, as advanced, was available.
The fact that duress had never “gone there before” also does not
serve as compelling grounds against affirming the Court of Appeal’s
decision. Many celebrated cases from the Supreme Court took the law in
a new direction, with Lavallee and Ruzic being instructive examples. The
defining characteristic of duress, as Professor Coughlan pointed out in
his case comment on the Court of Appeal case, is the nature of the
threats. Duress, he noted, could “with no reinterpretation be applicable
where the target of the offence is the aggressor: ‘assist me in committing
suicide or I will shoot you.’ for example”.70 It is disappointing that the
Supreme Court showed such trepidation when faced with an individual
whose actions were properly viewed as morally involuntary. The Court
68
Maria Kohlman, “Canada Offers ‘Duress’ Defence for Battered Women” Ms. Magazine
(April 14, 2011).
69
Kirk Makin, “Nova Scotia court issues landmark decision for abused women” The Globe
and Mail (April 10, 2011), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>.
70
Steve Coughlan, “R. v. Ryan: Duress is Not Necessary Where Necessity is Sufficient”
(2011) 84 C.R. (6th) 311, at 313.
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had an opportunity to further the limits of the common law in a way
consistent with the principles of fundamental justice, but declined to do
so. Fortunately, the Court’s overly cautious deferential approach may not
be the last word for women who find themselves in Ms. Doucet’s plight,
and Parliament itself may have afforded the solution to this dilemma.

VI. COULD THE NEXT MS. DOUCET AVAIL HERSELF OF THE NEW
SELF-DEFENCE PROVISION?
In March 2013, a new self-defence provision came into force,
replacing the prior provisions contained in sections 34 to 37. These old
provisions were complicated and often subject to academic and judicial
criticism. Indeed, if duress was seen before as a “mess”, self-defence was
an all-out disaster. The new provision contained in section 34 is
essentially a reasonableness test:
34(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if
(a) they believe on reasonable grounds that force is being used against
them or another person or that a threat of force is being made
against them or another person;
(b) the act that constitutes the offence is committed for the purpose of
defending or protecting themselves or the other person from that
use or threat of force; and
(c) the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances.
(2) In determining whether the act committed is reasonable in the
circumstances, the court shall consider the relevant circumstances of
the person, the other parties and the act, including, but not limited to,
the following factors:
(a) the nature of the force or threat;
(b) the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether
there were other means available to respond to the potential use of
force;
(c) the person’s role in the incident;
(d) whether any party to the incident used or threatened to use a
weapon;
(e) the size, age, gender and physical capabilities of the parties to the
incident;
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(f) the nature, duration and history of any relationship between the
parties to the incident, including any prior use or threat of force
and the nature of that force or threat;
(f.1) any history of interaction or communication between the parties to
the incident;
(g) the nature and proportionality of the person’s response to the use
or threat of force; and
(h) whether the act committed was in response to a use or threat of
force that the person knew was lawful.
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply if the force is used or threatened
by another person for the purpose of doing something that they are
required or authorized by law to do in the administration or
enforcement of the law, unless the person who commits the act that
constitutes the offence believes on reasonable grounds that the other
person is acting unlawfully.

This new provision could apply to the next Ms. Doucet, as academic
commentators have already noted. Section 34 may justify an accused
committing any crime in defence of themselves or others if it is
reasonable to do so.71 In thinking about the enumerated factors through
the lens of Ms. Doucet’s situation, and the commentary surrounding
Ryan, a number of points can be made.
Many questioned the legitimacy of Ms. Doucet’s evidence because
she had not previously disclosed the physical and sexual violence. It
must be kept in mind, however, the instruction from R. v. Lavallee (and
what advocates for abused women have been saying for years) that a
“manifestation of this victimization is a reluctance to disclose to others
the fact or extent of the beatings”.72 As with the doctrine of recent
complaint in the context of sexual offences, the law must be careful not
to impose artificial and discriminatory beliefs. While prior disclosure
may prove corroborative, the lack thereof may signify nothing more than
the reality that many women, for various reasons, do not disclose abuse.
Further, there are many and various reasons why women do not
report abuse. For Ms. Doucet, it was because she was afraid of the

Coughlan, “The Rise and Fall of Duress”, supra, note 47, at 115 and 124; Gerry Ferguson
& Benjamin L. Berger, “Recent Developments in Canadian Criminal Law” (2013) 37 Crim. L.J.
315, at 320-22.
72
[1990] S.C.J. No. 36, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, at para. 54 (S.C.C.).
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consequences from Mr. Ryan and the lack thereof from the justice
system:
I was afraid. I was afraid because of what he would do if I ever refused.
I just had to protect [their daughter]. I had to protect myself. You keep
the peace. If you don’t disobey, you’re keeping the peace. You don’t
know what to do. You feel helpless. You feel worthless. You don’t
even feel like a human being anymore, but you know that you have to
do it in order to be safe.
...
… if I would have reported him, my life wouldn’t have been worth
living, because the only thing that the RCMP officers would have done
would have been to come and ask him, “Did you do that?” and he
would deny everything, paint them a pretty picture like he always does
and then they would just leave me alone there with him and that would
have been too dangerous to take the chance. 73

Ms. Doucet’s actions were also considered highly suspicious because
the last threat Mr. Ryan had uttered was weeks in the past. This view
ignores that reality that the violence and control the abuser has inflicted
are not isolated, separate acts. As LEAF and CAEFS submitted to the
Supreme Court in Ryan, “acts of coercion and control through physical,
psychological and sexual violence … constitute an aggregate pattern of
coercive control, intended to keep women in a state of constant dread and
to induce compliance with the abuser’s demands”.74 In finding that
Ms. Doucet reasonably apprehended mortal danger, the trial judge
properly considered the preceding 15 years of violence and control by
Mr. Ryan, the ongoing effects of his conduct on Ms. Doucet and the
heightened lethal danger posed by abusive men who stalk their spouses
following separation. The question that had to be asked is “was there
sufficient evidence to establish … that a woman like Ms. Doucet, abused
for years, would have acted similarly?”75
The reference to “other means” in subsection 34(2)(b) will invariably
import the notion from previous case law that there be “no other safe
avenue” before one’s actions are deemed “morally involuntary”. This is
an essential factor that must be considered. If there was another avenue
or means of escape, the law should not pass moral judgment lightly.
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Ms. Doucet, many offered, should have gone to a shelter. But as noted
above, it is not just the degree of violence that affects how a woman
experiences her situation and her available options — it is the extent and
degree of the control and coercion she has been subjected to during her
relationship.76 The assessment of whether conduct is “voluntary” — the
product of “free will” and a controlled body unhindered by external
constraints — must reflect this reality. Given the number of women
killed in Canada by their ex-partners each year, it cannot be said that
leaving or going to a shelter, is always a “safe avenue of escape”. The
danger women are in when they leave their abusers should not be
overlooked or minimized in this assessment.
In the context of discussing “no safe avenue of escape”, I must point
out what I see as a fundamental contradiction — and a highly
problematic one — in how some viewed Ms. Doucet’s actions and the
“castle doctrine” as it is understood in the context of self-defence. This
doctrine holds that a person need not retreat from their “castle” in order
for their actions in defending themselves to be excused. For example, a
man like Mr. Angelis, who is almost twice the size of his wife, did not
have to duck out the door of his apartment, only feet away, before his act
of killing her could be seen as potentially justifiable.77 Not “excusable”
— but all-out justifiable.78 In fact, in Ontario, under Forde and Docherty,
a trier of fact is not even permitted to consider whether simply walking
out the door may have been a “safe avenue of escape” and may have
saved the victim’s life.79 In many cases it would be untenable to require
that one should retreat from one’s home before being able to legitimately
defend oneself. It is also unrealistic to think that leaving would
necessarily ensure one’s safety. However, it should be one of many
factors that a trier of fact should be able to consider when assessing
whether taking another’s life was justified.
When advancing a claim of self-defence based on the new provision,
the defence, at least at this point, will have to call expert evidence about
the impact on the accused of violence and coercion in order for the trier
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to be able to assess whether their actions were “reasonable”. However,
I cannot leave it unsaid that in many cases defences are advanced and
accepted without any expert evidence. As Susan Chapman and Howard
Krongold argued for the Criminal Lawyers’ Association in Ryan, to
always require expert opinion in such cases would be akin to imposing a
corroboration requirement on women’s evidence:
[I]t is important to recognize that expert evidence may not always be
necessary to demonstrate the battered spouse’s perspective. To always
demand expert evidence in such a case is to impose a sort of
corroboration requirement on the evidence of a woman accused of a
crime. This is neither fair nor justified. One day it may not be necessary
for a woman to call expert evidence to corroborate the reasonableness
of her belief that a man who has for many years raped her, threatened
her life and the life of her child, provided details as to his planned
disposal of their bodies, held a gun to her head, etc. represents an
ongoing threat to her life and the life of her child. Until then, the option
to adduce expert evidence in order to put the accused’s perspective into
proper context remains a crucial component of both a self-defence and
a duress claim.80

Further, and of course, we cannot always expect women to defend
themselves like men do, in “hand to hand combat”. Ms. Doucet was not on
the same footing with Mr. Ryan size-wise, nor did she have the ease of
access to guns that he had. Admittedly, there is “something” that is
unsettling about hiring a hit man. But had she killed him herself — had her
size or strength or access to guns allowed her to — she would have been
able to claim self-defence. Further, as Professor Elizabeth Sheehy posits:
[H]ow can women who are trapped by a terrifyingly violent male
partner ensure that they save their own lives without “planning”? ... Is
there a moral difference between spontaneous self-defence, where a
woman happens upon a weapon at just the right moment to fend off a
potentially murderous attack, and planned self-defence, where the
woman tries to guarantee her own survival by preparation? With no
other option that would demonstrably save her life, seeking aid from a
third party may well be a woman’s last resort. Jane Hurshman tried and
failed to hire a hit man to kill Billy Stafford. In the end she committed
the homicide herself, but does that change the fact in either scenario she
was acting in self-defence?81
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Finally, not all “battered women” fit one mould, a mould some
thought Ms. Doucet — being educated with a full-time job — did not fit.
The comments of McLachlin and L’Heureux-Dubé JJ. in their decision in
Malott remain instructive:
It is possible that those women who are unable to fit themselves within
the stereotype of a victimized, passive, helpless, dependent, battered
woman will not have their claims to self-defence fairly decided. For
instance, women who have demonstrated too much strength or
initiative, women of colour, women who are professionals, or women
who might have fought back against their abusers on previous
occasions, should not be penalized for failing to accord with the
stereotypical image of the archetypal battered woman. … Needless to
say, women with these characteristics are still entitled to have their
claims of self-defence fairly adjudicated, and they are also still entitled
to have their experiences as battered women inform the analysis.
Professor Grant … warns against allowing the law to develop such that
a woman accused of killing her abuser must either have been
“reasonable ‘like a man’ or reasonable ‘like a battered woman’”.
I agree that this must be avoided. The “reasonable woman” must not be
forgotten in the analysis, and deserves to be as much a part of the
objective standard of the reasonable person as does the “reasonable
man”.
… The legal inquiry into the moral culpability of a woman who is, for
instance, claiming self-defence must focus on the reasonableness of her
actions in the context of her personal experiences, and her experiences
as a woman, not on her status as a battered woman and her entitlement
to claim that she is suffering from “battered woman syndrome”. … By
emphasizing a woman’s “learned helplessness”, her dependence, her
victimization, and her low self-esteem, in order to establish that she
suffers from “battered woman syndrome”, the legal debate shifts from
the objective rationality of her actions to preserve her own life to those
personal inadequacies which apparently explain her failure to flee from
her abuser. Such an emphasis comports too well with society’s
stereotypes about women. Therefore, it should be scrupulously avoided
because it only serves to undermine the important advancements
achieved by the decision in Lavallee.82

82
R. v. Malott, [1998] S.C.J. No. 12, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 123, at paras. 40 and 41 (S.C.C.)
(citations omitted).

482

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

VII. CONCLUSION
Our law will always have a healthy skepticism to some defences. As
McLachlin J. wrote in McIntosh, “[l]ife is precious; the justification for
taking it must be defined with care and circumspection”.83 The new selfdefence provisions, as they may apply to situations like Ms. Doucet’s,
must be advanced and understood in recognition of the realities of
domestic violence and its varying impact on women’s lives and the
“choices” they make.
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